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Non-technical summaryAbstract
The excess sensitivity of investment to cash ￿ ow has been demonstrated in numerous stud-
ies. Recent research has identi￿ed di⁄erences in the degree of sensitivity across countries, which
it ascribes to the nature of the lender-borrower relationship in the ￿nancial systems of those
countries. In this paper we o⁄er new methods and results to determine whether di⁄erences are
associated with structural explanations such as the nature of the ￿nancial system and industrial
composition, or due to other ￿rm-speci￿c determinants such as size or creditworthiness. Unlike
previous research we are able to systematically control for competing explanations in our data
from more than one country and thereby isolate what drives the relationship. We ￿nd that
creditworthiness is the main driving force of cash ￿ ow sensitivity.
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May 2005In the vast literature on the relationship between cash ￿ ow and investment all but a
few papers are based on sample-splitting between constrained and unconstrained ￿rms taken
from a single country. Recent evidence provided in Bond et al. (2003) and Chatelain et al.
(2003) does make a comparison between cash ￿ ow sensitivity of investment in a range of
European countries. Bond et al. (2003) shows investment of UK ￿rms to be more sensitive
to cash ￿ ow ￿ uctuations than the investment of ￿rms in other European countries, but most
notably Germany. This paper seeks to explain why the the degree of sensitivity in the UK
appears to be greater than that of Germany. This paper extends the literature by examining
from a number of perspectives the behaviour of ￿rms in these two European countries that
are regarded as polar cases of predominantly market-￿nanced and bank-￿nanced systems .
The paper proposes several hypotheses that are explored in turn. A ￿rst possible reason
is that ￿rms in market-oriented ￿nancial systems show greater sensitivity to cash ￿ ow because
borrowers and lenders operate at arms length compared to those in relationship-oriented
systems. A second possible cause for di⁄erences in response to cash ￿ ow across countries is
that the samples of ￿rms taken from each country might di⁄er in composition with respect to
particular characteristics, for instance size. Equally, the industrial type may be an important
determinant of investment sensitivity to cash ￿ ow since industries di⁄er considerably in terms
of the size of ￿rms, capital-intensity, borrowing capacity, openness and the durability of their
output.
In this paper we use samples of ￿rms derived from the AMADEUS database from Ger-
many and the UK to investigate whether ￿nancial system, ￿rm size, or industrial structure
are possible driving determinants of the investment cash ￿ ow sensitivity. These can be seen
as possible structural determinants of ￿nancing constraints but even if we ￿nd that one of
these determinants is driving cash ￿ ow sensitivity it is not su¢ cient to infer that these are
causal. A likely non-structural cause of responsiveness to cash ￿ ow is the general creditwor-
thiness of ￿rms and this might be correlated with size and industry. However this correlation
will vary over time and between countries at a given point in time.
Our ￿ndings on the possible determinants are as follows. First, we con￿rm the result
of Bond et al. (2003) where cash ￿ ow sensitivities are more pronounced in market-oriented
￿nancial systems, i.e. we ￿nd that in the full samples of corporate data for the UK and
Germany, the UK ￿rms are more sensitive. But these results are sensitive to sample com-
position, since the result obtained in the full sample is not found when the samples are
closely-matched to ensure that ￿rms have comparable size and industrial classi￿cations. We
conclude that ￿nancial system is not the determinant of cash ￿ ow sensitivity. Second, we do
not ￿nd ￿rms￿size to be a determinant of cash ￿ ow sensitivity either in Germany or in the
UK. Third, we ￿nd evidence that industrial characteristics are determinants of sensitivity
in the UK but not in Germany. When investigating the economic performance we ￿nd that
those industries with the weakest performance in the UK are most sensitive to cash ￿ ow. We
conclude that the nature of the industry is important, but not in a purely structural sense,
since it is the creditworthiness industry-by-industry that determines the availability of ex-
ternal ￿nance and the sensitivity to cash ￿ ow. Ultimately we conclude that creditworthiness
on a range of measurable criteria is the driving force of the investment cash ￿ ow sensitivity
irrespective of the country of origin of the ￿rms concerned .
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Non-technical summary1 Introduction
There is a large literature that identi￿es an in￿ uence of ￿nancial market imperfections on
corporate investment and economic ￿ uctuations. Beginning with Fazzari et al. (1988),
this literature has documented the e⁄ects of asymmetric information on access to external
￿nance, and has shown that ￿rms that are identi￿ed a priori as ￿nancially constrained show
greater sensitivity in investment to the availability of internal ￿nance proxied by cash ￿ ow.
The sensitivity of ￿nancially constrained ￿rms to internal sources of ￿nance o⁄ers support
for the broad credit channel of monetary policy.
Most of these results are based on sample-splitting between constrained and uncon-
strained ￿rms taken from the same country, but more recently evidence has been gathered
on investment sensitivity to cash ￿ ow across a range of countries. For example, in a recent
comparative study between ￿rms in Belgium, France, Germany and the UK, Bond et al.
(2003) present evidence that the investment of UK ￿rms is more sensitive to cash ￿ ow ￿ uc-
tuations than the investment of ￿rms in the three continental European countries. However,
not all of these countries showed the same degree of sensitivity in corporate investment to
cash ￿ ow variables (as we might have expected if the broad credit channel a⁄ected ￿nancially
constrained ￿rms in each of the countries in exactly the same way), so the focus of attention
has necessarily shifted to ascertain the reason for the di⁄erences in the response to cash ￿ ow
between countries.1
A ￿rst possible reason why the broad credit channel appears to be more powerful in
some countries than in others is that the ￿nancial systems deal di⁄erently with the asym-
metric information problem. It is possible that ￿rms in market-oriented ￿nancial systems
show greater sensitivity to cash ￿ ow because borrowers and lenders operate at arms length
compared to relationship-oriented systems. For example, Allen and Gale (2000) indicate
that Germany and the UK, which show di⁄erent sensitivities to cash ￿ ow in the study by
Bond et al. (2003), are on opposite sides of the ￿nancial spectrum. In the UK, equity market
capitalisation as a percentage of GDP is far higher than in Germany, and corporate control is
exercised by the ￿nancial markets rather than banks, in contrast to Germany. The ￿nancial
system argument proposes that the arrangement of ￿nancial systems is responsible for the
di⁄erences in the importance of the broad lending channel relationships across countries and
this results in di⁄erences in the estimated relationships between investment and cash ￿ ow2.
1Mairesse and Dormont (1985) provide a comparative investment analysis for the period 1970-79 using
French, German and US large manufacturing ￿rms. They ￿nd relatively similar investment behaviour in the
di⁄erent countries.
2While identifying the key di⁄erences between ￿nancial systems, Allen and Gale (2000) do not go so far
as to assert that this is the reason for di⁄erences in cash ￿ ow sensitivity. In fact they argue that ￿ Given
the importance of internal ￿nance in most countries, it could be argued that institutional di⁄erences in the
￿nancial system are immaterial. This is one of the fundamental questions posed in comparing ￿nancial
6
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systems. ￿Bond et al. (2003) take the ￿nancial system to be an important consideration in explaining
cross-country di⁄erences in cash ￿ ow sensitivity, although they are careful to state that other
factors might be the cause of the di⁄erences, and state that more research is needed.
A second possible cause for di⁄erences in response to cash ￿ ow across countries is that
the samples of ￿rms taken from each country might di⁄er in composition with respect to
characteristics such as ￿rm size. Firm size has been regarded as an important determinant of
￿nancial constraints in studies of the credit channel within countries (Gertler and Gilchrist,
1994, Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996, Vermeulen 2002) and may explain di⁄erences between
countries. However it is not easy to determine whether ￿rms are ￿nancially constrained
because they are small, or small because they are ￿nancially constrained. Moreover, the
ultimate cause of the di⁄ering sensitivities to monetary policy may re￿ ect deeper underlying
e⁄ects associated with, for example, the industrial type and its cyclical nature (Eichenbaum,
1994). Size is correlated with other characteristics that indicate ￿rms are less likely to obtain
external ￿nance because small ￿rms are often young, poorly collateralized and risky.
A third possible cause for sensitivity di⁄erences is that samples across countries might
di⁄er in industrial structure. A recent line of research suggests that di⁄erences in industry
characteristics are important determinants of investment sensitivity to cash ￿ ow. Ganley
and Salmon (1997), Hayo and Uhlenbrock (2000), Dedola and Lippi (2004), and Peersman
and Smets (2004) have found that industries di⁄er considerably in terms of the size of
￿rms, capital-intensity, borrowing capacity (de￿ned by leverage and size), openness and
the durability of their output, and these have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on their ￿nancing and
investment behavior. These di⁄erences between industries are powerful enough to dominate
the di⁄erences between countries according to Dedola and Lippi (2004) and Peersman and
Smets (2004).
In this paper we use samples of ￿rms derived from the AMADEUS database from Ger-
many and the UK to investigate whether ￿nancial system, ￿rm size, or industrial structure
are possible driving determinants of the investment cash ￿ ow sensitivity. These can be seen
as possible structural determinants of ￿nancing constraints in the sense that they are semi-
permanent features speci￿c to each economy. However, even if we ￿nd that one (or possibly
more than one) of these determinants is driving cash ￿ ow sensitivity it is not su¢ cient to
infer that these are causal. A likely non-structural cause of responsiveness to cash ￿ ow is
the creditworthiness of ￿rms and this might be correlated with size and industry. However
this correlation will vary over time and between countries at a given point in time. Some
industries (￿rm size classes) might have healthy balance sheets at certain times, but weak
ones at other times. A ￿nding, in a given sample, that some industries are more sensitive
than others is therefore not su¢ cient evidence in favor of industry as a determinant of
￿nancing constraints. The comparison between the UK and Germany gives us a means to
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in the sense discussed above. If this is the case we should ￿nd that German ￿rms are less
sensitive than UK ￿rms, controlling for size and industry. We then investigate whether size
or industry are determinants, irrespective of creditworthiness. If these are determinants we
should ￿nd that the cash ￿ ow sensitivity di⁄erences across size classes or across industry
groupings are similar for Germany and the UK. Essentially, if size and industry characteristics
are structural determinants of cash ￿ ow sensitivity then these properties should be found in
both the UK and in Germany when comparing similar size and industry classes. We ￿nally
check if creditworthiness might be at the core of the di⁄erences we ￿nd.
Our ￿ndings on the possible determinants are as follows. First, we con￿rm the result
of Bond et al. (2003) where cash ￿ ow sensitivities are more pronounced in market-oriented
￿nancial systems, i.e. we ￿nd that in the full samples of corporate data for the UK and
Germany, the UK ￿rms are more sensitive. But these results are sensitive to sample com-
position, since the result obtained in the full sample is not found when the samples are
closely-matched to ensure that ￿rms have comparable size and industrial classi￿cations. We
conclude that ￿nancial structure is not an important determinant of cash ￿ ow sensitivity.
Second, we do not ￿nd ￿rms￿size to be a determinant of cash ￿ ow sensitivity either in Ger-
many or in the UK. Third, we ￿nd evidence that industrial characteristics are determinants
of sensitivity in the UK but not in Germany. When investigating the economic performance
we ￿nd that those industries with the weakest performance in the UK are most sensitive to
cash ￿ ow. We conclude that the nature of the industry is important, but not in a purely
structural sense, since it is the creditworthiness industry-by-industry that determines the
availability of external ￿nance and the sensitivity to cash ￿ ow. Ultimately we conclude that
creditworthiness is the driving force of the investment cash ￿ ow sensitivity.
The next section discusses the background issues in the literature. In section 3 we
discuss our methodology for discriminating between the driving factors in the relationship
between corporate investment and ￿nancial constraints. Section 4 describes our data sources
and then the results are reported in section 5.
2 Literature
2.1 Investment and cash ￿ ow sensitivity
There is a large literature that estimates the impact of ￿nancial constraints on the investment
behavior of ￿rms beginning with the seminal article by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988).
They classify ￿rms according to whether they were likely to be ￿nancially constrained on the
basis of their size, dividend payouts and capital structure and this characteristic determines
whether they are more sensitive to the supply of internal funds measured by cash ￿ ow. The
highest sensitivities to cash ￿ ow are found for ￿rms categorized as ￿nancially constrained,
and this is taken to indicate that ￿nancial constraints are binding in this case. Many further
studies have followed the same methodology including Chirinko and Schaller (1995), Hubbard
et al. (1995), Calomiris and Hubbard (1995), as summarized by Hubbard (1998).
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and Zingales (1997, 2000) have argued that the classi￿cation adopted by Fazzari et al.
(1988) tends to assign ￿rms incorrectly. They make use of more detailed information in
￿nancial statements from annual reports to classify the same ￿rms over an identical sample
period into three categories ￿ ￿nancially constrained￿ , ￿ possibly ￿nancially constrained￿and
￿ not ￿nancially constrained￿ . Using this classi￿cation they ￿nd that ￿nancially constrained
￿rms have the lowest sensitivity of investment to cash ￿ ow. On a larger dataset Cleary
(1999) also ￿nds that the most constrained ￿rms have the lowest sensitivity. Recently,
Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) show that the ￿ndings of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) can
be explained by a few in￿ uential observations whereas the results of Cleary (1999) can be
explained by observations of ￿rms with negative cash ￿ ows. One of the main messages of
the work by Kaplan and Zingales and Clearly is that for ￿rms under distress the cash ￿ ow
sensitivity might be reduced, so that for severely constrained ￿rms the usual relationship
found in the literature might be reversed. We think that one of the more important reasons
to be cautious in interpreting cash ￿ ow sensitivity as indicating ￿nancing constraints is that
cash ￿ ow might forecast future pro￿tability or sales growth. We check for this possibility,
but as in Bond et al. (2003), our results indicate that it is not an important problem in our
sample.
2.2 Cash ￿ ow sensitivity and the ￿nancial system
The ￿nancial system of a country dictates how the common problem of asymmetric in-
formation will be handled. The idea that the ￿nancial system has an important role to
play in economic ￿ uctuations, and investment in particular, is an old one. (See Gertler
(1988) for an overview.) Market-oriented ￿nancial systems where arms-length lenders of-
fer funds through commercial paper, corporate bond and equity markets are more likely
to show greater sensitivity to cash ￿ ow. Relationship-oriented systems are likely to foster
closer and more transparent arrangements that allow them to exercise greater scrutiny over
borrowers, and as a result investors will be less sensitive to internal sources of funds. An
excellent discussion of the principal di⁄erences between the two structures is given in Rajan
and Zingales (2003). The evidence in Allen and Gale (2000) indicates that Germany and
the UK, are good examples of the polar cases on the wide spectrum of ￿nancial systems in
Europe. In the UK, market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP is some three times that
of Germany, and corporate control is exercised by the ￿nancial markets rather than banks,
in contrast to Germany. Nevertheless bond markets are much less well developed in Ger-
many and the UK versus the US. Although ￿rms in both countries rely heavily on internal
funds, and the development of market ￿nance has been signi￿cant in the period 1995- 2004
even in Germany (c.f. Rajan and Zingales, 2003), the impact of these systems could a⁄ect
the sensitivity of investment to cash ￿ ow. Analysis of these economies to internal funds at
the margin is expected to show investment will be more sensitive to internal funds (cash
9
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if the ￿nancial system is the driving force behind the importance of cash ￿ ow. Bond et
al. (2003) o⁄er one of the few comparative studies of the impact of cash ￿ ow on investment
across several countries with di⁄erent ￿nancial systems. Their results are based on estimates
of investment equations for four European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, and the
United Kingdom), and o⁄er some support for di⁄erences between countries that are more
market-oriented (United Kingdom) or relationship-oriented (Germany). They are quick to
acknowledge, however, that other factors may have an important role to play.
2.3 Cash ￿ ow sensitivity and size
Firm size has been used as an indicator of access to external ￿nance (Gertler and Gilchrist,
1994). In addition small ￿rms are generally younger, with higher levels of ￿rm-speci￿c risk,
and less collateral, making them less likely to attract external ￿nance. The evidence suggests
that small ￿rms are more sensitive to monetary policy tightening than larger ￿rms. Gertler
and Gilchrist (1994) document that indicators of monetary tightening such as Romer dates
are highly signi￿cant explanatory variables in time series estimates of small ￿rms￿sales,
inventory accumulation and short-term debt, in direct contrast to estimates for large ￿rms3.
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) ￿nd excess sensitivity for small ￿rms, and those with out
a bond rating or commercial paper issue in their sample. According to Schaller (1993)
small ￿rms and those that do not belong to a corporate group in Canada are more sensitive
to cash ￿ ow than others. However not all evidence on size goes in the same direction. In
their seminal study Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) point out that when they split
samples according to size, small ￿rms have relatively low cash ￿ ow coe¢ cients. Also, Hu
and Schiantarelli (1998) ￿nd that larger ￿rms are more likely to be ￿nancially constrained
. They explain their result by arguing that (at least in their sample of listed ￿rms) ￿rm
size may be inversely related to concentration of ownership, which tends to mitigate agency
problems. On the basis of a formal framework that relates theory to empirical investment
models, Chirinko (1997) argues that ￿rm size (and retention behavior) are not appropriate
criteria for identifying ￿nancially constrained ￿rms.
One has to be careful in projecting the results obtained on US data to European ￿rms. In
the US studies, the larger ￿rms are quite di⁄erent from the small ￿rms in that the large ￿rms
have access to bond markets and the commercial paper market. The split really selects ￿rms
into those that obtain external ￿nance from banks versus those that obtain external ￿nance
from the markets. In contrast, in Germany and the UK, bond markets and commercial paper
markets are much less developed than in the US implying that a large-small ￿rm sample split
is less likely to generate a partition between bank versus market ￿nanced ￿rms. Rather both
3Although there are statistically signi￿cant di⁄erences in the response to monetary policy in relation to
￿rm size, and this has been strongly associated with ￿nancial constraints, it is di¢ cult to be sure about the
direction of causation. (Eichenbaum, 1994)
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study of Germany, France, Italy and Spain, Chatelain et al. (2003) ￿nd a signi￿cant larger
e⁄ect of cash ￿ ow for smaller ￿rms only in the Italian case. So a priori from the above
studies it is di¢ cult to argue that small ￿rms are necessarily more likely to face ￿nancing
constraints in the UK and Germany compared to large ￿rms.
2.4 Cash ￿ ow sensitivity and industrial structure
In a study of the regional e⁄ects of monetary policy, Carlino and DeFina (1998) show that
there are some signi￿cant deviations from the average US response to monetary policy
changes over the period 1958-1992 at the regional level. They argue that one potential
explanation for the di⁄erences in regional response to the federal funds rate is the di⁄erent
industrial composition of the regions. Manufacturing industry intensive states are more sen-
sitive to monetary policy shocks than states with a greater diversity of industries, and states
with greater numbers of small ￿rms also are marginally more sensitive.
A new literature has taken up this theme making use of industrial characteristics to
determine whether these features are responsible for di⁄erences in the output response to
monetary policy between countries. Barth and Ramey (2000) have linked the di⁄erential
e⁄ects of monetary policy shocks to the impact of ￿ cost￿and ￿ demand￿in￿ uences in monetary
transmission, which are connected to the exposure of particular types of industries to these
in￿ uences.
Dedola and Lippi (2004) and Peersman and Smets (2004) have shown that industries
with characteristics such as greater investment intensity, openness and more durable goods
are more likely to show greater sensitivity to changing monetary policy because their ￿ cost
side is more sensitive to the real cost of capital￿ . These industries are more interest sensitive
than others, enhancing the impact of the interest channel of monetary policy on the output
cycle. They also argue that industries that have greater di¢ culty in accessing ￿nancial mar-
kets, with higher working capital requirements and greater borrowing capacity (as measured
by size and leverage) could be more prone to the broad credit channel e⁄ects of monetary
transmission. The output response is reported from a structural VAR framework for 20
industries in ￿ve OECD countries by Dedola and Lippi (2004) and from a single-equation
autoregression of output growth for 74 industries in the euro area countries by Peersman and
Smets (2004). Di⁄erences in the policy e⁄ects by industry are shown to be explained primar-
ily by particular industry characteristics such as durability, openness and capital intensity
of production.
2.5 Cash ￿ ow sensitivity and creditworthiness
Di⁄erences in cash ￿ ow sensitivities by size and industry classes can ultimately be caused
by di⁄erences in creditworthiness by ￿rms. Hu and Schiantarelli (1998) ￿nd that ￿rms with
weaker balance sheets are more likely constrained. Clearly (1999) ￿nds that pro￿tability and
11
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￿rms that increase or decrease dividends (which he interprets as re￿ ecting the absence or
presence of ￿nancing constraints). We examine whether these indicators of creditworthiness
are correlated with sensitivity to cash ￿ ow in our industry and size classes. In other words,
we determine whether there are some industries or some ￿rm classes that are more sensitive
to cash ￿ ow than others (even if they are the same industries in di⁄erent countries) because
their poor performance on these criteria makes them more reliant on internal ￿nance for
investment at the margin.
We do not espouse any one model in this paper, rather we approach each literature from
an agnostic point of view. The paper devises sample-splitting and sample-matching methods
to determine whether the predictions of each literature can be supported empirically. By
evaluating the models for more than one country and making comparisons between them
we hope to shed more light on the underlying reasons for cash ￿ ow sensitivity in investment
equations. The next section explains our methodology in detail.
3 Methodology
3.1 Investment equation
Mairesse et al. (1999) and Bond et al. (2003) are two recent cross-country investment
studies. We follow their methodology4 and model investment in a ￿ exible error correction
model. For a neoclassical pro￿t-maximizing ￿rm with a CES production function and no
adjustment costs the capital stock is proportional to output,
ki;t = ￿yi;t + hit (1)
with ki;tand yi;t the log of the capital stock and the log of output. hit is a function of
the user cost.
Assuming that the capital stock in the presence of adjustment costs evolves as an
ADL(2,2) model, equation 1 can be embedded as the long run solution and can be re-
written in an error correction format (see Bean, 1981) and assuming the change in the cap-
ital stock can be approximated by investment over previous capital stock less depreciation,
￿ki;t t
Ii;t














4When estimating an Euler speci￿cation for data from a range of European countries, Bond et al. (2003)
indicate that the model is ￿ seriously mispeci￿ed￿and o⁄er a distinctly lukewarm discussion of its performance.
We therefore focus solely on the error correction model.
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proportional adjustment argument forwarded by Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995),
which states that desired capital stock in the presence of adjustment costs is proportional
to the desired capital stock in the absence of adjustment costs. The variation in the user
cost is controlled for by ￿rm speci￿c e⁄ects and time dummies. The importance of ￿nancial
constraints in this model can be ascertained by including cash ￿ ow scaled by capital, as a
measure of the supply of internal funds, in the regression. We estimate the above equation
using ￿rst-di⁄erence GMM (Arrelano and Bond, 1991). We use the lagged variables in
levels as instruments for the ￿rst di⁄erences of the regressors. We use the Sargan-test of
overidentifying restrictions as a joint test of model speci￿cation and instrument selection.
We also report the m1 and m2 test of serial correlation of the ￿rst di⁄erenced residuals.
Both the m1 and m2 test are asymptotically standard normal under the null of no serial
correlation in ￿i;t:
3.2 Sampling procedure
Comparisons between countries can reasonably be expected to give di⁄erent magnitudes
to the coe¢ cients even if the investment behavior of ￿rms in each country is driven by
the same fundamental processes, but determining the root cause of these di⁄erences is not
straightforward. The previous section has indicated that di⁄erences in ￿nancial systems,
size and industrial structure are potential explanations for response to ￿nancial constraints
across countries. Unless we use methods that can isolate a single explanation by controlling
for the others it will be di¢ cult (if not impossible) to resolve the question of what drives
the relationship between ￿nancial constraints and corporate investment. In this section we
propose two methods based on matching and sample-splitting to construct specially selected
samples of data taken from corporate accounts in Germany and the United Kingdom to
evaluate each of the competing explanations of the sensitivity of investment to cash ￿ ow.
The ￿rst method seeks to control for size and industrial features in the samples from
each country that could be responsible for the di⁄erent sensitivities to cash ￿ ow between
countries. Comparisons of investment sensitivity to cash ￿ ow are typically drawn from the
population of ￿rms from each country without a designated sampling criterion. The samples
are constructed by randomly drawing ￿rms from the population of each country, but where
there are size or industrial characteristics that di⁄er between the populations of each country,
random sampling will re￿ ect these characteristics in the respective samples. It is possible
that the di⁄erent sensitivities to cash ￿ ow in investment equations are a re￿ ection of these
features in each country and not necessarily due to the in￿ uence of ￿nancial system. Only
in the exceptional cases where the sample is very large or the composition uniform in both
countries, could random sampling draw ￿rm conclusions that di⁄erences in sensitivity are
due to the ￿nancial system argument and not one of the competing views.
Conclusions drawn over the importance of ￿nancial system on investment may prove
fragile if sample-speci￿c features in the size of ￿rms or industrial structure are responsible
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robust conclusions about investment activity in di⁄erent countries in relation to their ￿nan-
cial structure we argue that steps should be taken to properly match ￿rms in each country
within the panel before making comparisons between them. While this will inevitably lead
to a smaller panel of usable ￿rms, the results are likely to be more reliable as a comparison
of investment activity under ￿nancial constraints between countries.
Our ￿rst method recognizes the importance of matching the ￿rms in the panel by se-
lecting ￿rm pairs from Germany and the UK to construct closely-matched samples. This
ensures that our ￿rms have common NACE codes for industrial classi￿cation and similar
sizes. These closely-matched samples only include those German ￿rms that have a close
match with a UK ￿rm and vice versa. We are able to determine whether the di⁄erences
in the results between the UK and Germany in the random samples are an artefact of the
composition by comparing them with the results of the closely-matched sample, and these
results are reported in the next section. We then address the question whether investment
is more or less sensitive to cash ￿ ow in the UK compared to Germany. If the ￿nancial struc-
ture argument is correct then the signi￿cance of the cash ￿ ow variable in ￿ market-oriented￿
as opposed to ￿ relationship-oriented￿economies will indicate that ￿nancial constraints bind
even when we control for the selection of ￿rms. If the sample composition is responsible for
the di⁄erences between the UK and Germany we should ￿nd no di⁄erences in sensitivity for
the sample that has been closely-matched for ￿rm type but clear di⁄erences between the
random samples.
Our second method controls for sample characteristics - such as size and industrial
structure - that might be responsible for di⁄erences in the sensitivity of investment to cash
￿ ow in each country. When we consider the in￿ uence of size we take into account factors such
as absolute and relative size of the ￿rm, where the level of sales indicates absolute size, and
relative sales i.e. sales compared to the other ￿rms in the same industry re￿ ects relative size
(because ￿rms may be large in relation to the average for their industry without being large
in an absolute sense). Small ￿rms have long been regarded as more ￿nancially constrained
than large ￿rms (c.f. Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994, Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995) and by
controlling for this characteristic we can determine whether it is the proportion of small
￿rms versus large ￿rms in each country sample that is responsible for the sensitivity to cash
￿ ow.
When we consider the in￿ uence of industrial structure we control for the nature of the
industry that might cause the ￿rms to be more sensitive to cash ￿ ow. The literature has
indicated that intermediate producers might be more sensitive to cash ￿ ow than ￿nal goods
producers due to the scale and duration of their investment projects. Likewise ￿rms that
operate in more closed industries that have less import competition or are more domesti-
cally oriented may also be more sensitive to ￿nancial constraints than ￿rms in more open
industries. We control for these features across countries to evaluate whether these criteria
are responsible for the di⁄erent sensitivities of investment to cash ￿ ow between countries.
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degree of sensitivity irrespective of the country from which they were drawn. For example,
if size or openness is the characteristic that determines excess sensitivity of investment to
cash ￿ ow then both German and UK ￿rms that are smaller than the average or less open
should show excess sensitivity, and larger than average ￿rms or those in more open industries
should show less sensitivity. This may con￿rm that size or industrial grouping is responsible
for the sensitivity to cash ￿ ow, as opposed to the nature of the ￿nancial system.
4 Results
4.1 Data
Our data are taken from the AMADEUS database. We only use variables that are compara-
ble across countries such as the capital stock, investment, sales and cash ￿ ow and these are
taken from balance sheets for manufacturing ￿rms. The details of how these variables were
constructed are described in the Appendix. From this database we ￿rst construct two full
samples: a sample of German ￿rms and a sample of UK ￿rms. We clean by dropping the
1 % outliers from the investment to capital ratio, cash ￿ ow to capital ratio, and the error
correction term. We have a consecutive run of at least ￿ve observations for each ￿rm over
the period 1993-99.
After cleaning, the full samples of British and the German ￿rms contain 2103 ￿rm-year
observations from 378 UK ￿rms and 804 ￿rm-year observations from 145 German ￿rms. The
summary statistics are given in Table 1. The full German and UK samples do not di⁄er
much between countries in terms of average investment (It=Kt￿1,), sales growth (￿yt) and
cash ￿ ow to capital ratio (CFt=Kt￿1). Although the average German ￿rm in our sample is
much larger than the average UK ￿rm when measured by sales. There is a large dispersion
within both samples in terms of size.5
As is quite usual with ￿rm panel data, ￿rms within each country tend to show more
substantial di⁄erences compared to the averages across countries in terms of the level of
investment, sales growth and the cash ￿ ow-to-capital ratio. The relative variation is of the
same order in Germany as in the UK. On the basis of these summary statistics used in the
investment regressions the two samples look very similar and it would be hard to predict
that the investment regressions would di⁄er across countries.
5The main reason for the smaller average of sales in the UK is the presence of many more smaller ￿rms.
Our use of consolidated accounts limits us in the selection of German ￿rms. Consolidation is common in the
UK among all ￿rms, in Germany only the larger ones consolidate.
If one of these features is responsible for the excess sensitivity of corporate investment to
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Germany UK
mean (st.dev.) min max mean (st.dev.) min max
It=Kt￿1 0.16 (0.14) -0.35 0.94 0.14 (0.17) -0.83 0.99
￿yt 0.04 (0.11) -0.68 0.60 0.03 (0.16) -1.01 0.95
CFt=Kt￿1 0.23 (0.23) -0.24 2.04 0.22 (0.22) -0.50 1.82
(k ￿ y)t￿2 -1.05 (.49) -2.57 0.13 -1.12 (.63) -3.22 0.68
sales (£m) 1550 (4470) 15.6 44900 241 (814) 7.1 8720
N. Obs. 804 2103
N. ￿rms 145 378
Sales are in millions of pounds sterling at 1995 prices.
German sales are converted to pounds sterling using DM2.63 = £1
4.2 Results from full sample of UK and German ￿rms
In this section we report the estimates of an error correction model using full samples of
data from the UK and Germany. These are reported in Table 2. The Sargan p-value and
the m1 and m2 statistics indicate that the model is well speci￿ed both for Germany and
the UK. There is a positive and signi￿cant in￿ uence from current and lagged sales growth in
Germany and from current sales growth in the UK. The error correction term is signi￿cant
and of the right sign in Germany, while it is insigni￿cant in the UK. Cash ￿ ow has a positive
and signi￿cant e⁄ect on investment in the UK, while in Germany cash ￿ ow is not signi￿cant.
Interestingly, in a comparative study by the European System of Central Banks, using more
than 5000 observation for Germany, Chatelain et al. (2003) ￿nd that none of the four cash
￿ ow terms is signi￿cant using an autoregressive distributed lag for investment. We ￿nd some
similarities in the qualitative results between our error correction model for investment in
the 1990s and the same model of Bond et al. (2003) for the 1980s, although the magnitude
of the coe¢ cients in the 1990s is substantially higher than the 1980s. Nevertheless, Bond et
al. (2003) do ￿nd some small positive signi￿cant e⁄ect (albeit smaller than the UK) of cash
￿ ow in Germany.
Cummins et al. (1999) and Bond and Cummins (2001) show that the inclusion of
earnings data from securities analysts as an indicator of returns to investment results in a
much reduced correlation between investment and cash ￿ ow. This suggests that there is a
possibility that cash ￿ ow is a proxy for information on earnings in the investment equation.
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) also indicate that if cash ￿ ow is a proxy for future earnings,
sales or pro￿tability we may not be measuring the sensitivity to internal ￿nance at all. Since
cash ￿ ow could be a proxy for other determinants of investment such as future sales growth or
expected pro￿tability that are not captured by current and past sales growth we investigate
the possibility that cash ￿ ow may forecast future sales growth. The hypothesis that cash
￿ ow predicts future sales growth can be tested directly by creating forecast equations for
sales. Bond et al. (2003) have found cash ￿ ow does help predict sales growth in three of their
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countries (as we would expect if the omitted variable argument were true). In our study,
cash ￿ ow is marginally signi￿cant in the sales growth equation for Germany, but cash ￿ ow
did not appear to be important to corporate investment in Germany. There is no evidence
that cash ￿ ow helps predict future sales growth in the UK where cash ￿ ow was an important
determinant of investment.6
Our results from the full sample indicate that there are systematic di⁄erences between
cash ￿ ow sensitivity in Germany and the UK. One conclusion we could draw is that the UK
￿nancial system is less able to resolve asymmetric information problems and this creates
greater sensitivity to cash ￿ ow as a result. There are however competing arguments that
we would need to assess before we could draw this conclusion. The di⁄erence in cash ￿ ow
sensitivity could be caused by di⁄erences in absolute or relative ￿rm sizes across countries
since UK ￿rms are typically smaller on average than the German ￿rms. If smaller ￿rms
are more ￿nancially constrained, then the UK ￿rms would show higher cash ￿ ow sensitivity
than larger German ￿rms because of their size, irrespective of the fact that ￿nancial systems
are di⁄erent. Another possibility is that the di⁄erence could be a re￿ ection of industrial
structure, particularly if certain industrial sectors with greater investment intensity face
more exposure to changes in monetary policy through interest and credit channels in the
UK than in Germany. Just as size could be responsible for the increased sensitivity of ￿rms
in one country (the UK) compared to another (Germany), so industrial features could also
be the driving force. Finally, the creditworthiness of (at least some ￿rms in the UK sample)
could cause a higher sensitivity for the UK sample. The next section tests these possible
explanations of the cash ￿ ow sensitivity of investment discovered in the full samples. These
are based on industrial structure and size using appropriately constructed samples drawn
from the UK and Germany to control for the competing views.
6In all our subsequent regressions for matched samples and split-samples we ran regressions to determine
whether cash ￿ ow was a predictor of future sales growth. We have not reported these results in the paper
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Dependent variable It=Kt￿1 Full Sample
Germany U.K.
It￿1=Kt￿2 -0.51 (0.13)** -0.24 (0.11)*
￿yt 0.60 (0.17)** 0.67 (0.17)**
￿yt￿1 0.62 (0.14)** 0.15 (0.12)
(k ￿ y)t￿2 -0.59 (0.15)** -0.16 (0.11)
CFt=Kt￿1 -0.15 (0.16) -0.02 (0.16)
CFt￿1=Kt￿2 -0.23 (0.12) 0.28 (0.09)**
m1 -3.98 -6.07
m2 -0.69 0.14
Sargan p-value 0.64 0.65
N obs 490 1230
N ￿rms 145 378
Dependent variable ￿yt
It￿1=Kt￿2 0.17 (0.43)** 0.17 (0.03)**
It￿2=Kt￿3 0.06 (0.04) -0.02 (0.03)
￿yt￿1 0.07 (0.06) 0.18 (0.03)
￿yt￿2 -0.01 (0.05) 0.03 (0.03)
CFt￿1=Kt￿2 0.12 (0.05)* 0.02 (0.03)
CFt￿2=Kt￿3 -0.10 (0.05)* -0.10 (0.03)
Notes: Parameter estimates and robust standard errors from one-step Arrelano-Bond; year-
dummies and constant included. Signi￿cance reported at 1% (**), 5% (*) levels. Sargan test of over-









4.3 Cash ￿ ow sensitivity and ￿nancial system
The results reported in this section are derived from samples that control for size and in-
dustrial activity by ensuring that the German and British ￿rms are closely matched. The
remaining di⁄erences between them should not result from di⁄erences in the size of ￿rms or
their area of industrial activity. Having controlled for these features, we should ￿nd that our
earlier result that UK ￿rms are more sensitive to cash ￿ ow than German ￿rms is upheld in
the matched samples if the nature of the ￿nancial system is the main determinant of cash
￿ ow sensitivity.
From the full samples, two matched samples are constructed. The matching process is
as follows. The ￿rms in each sample are divided into homogeneous industries (NACE - 3
digit) and are then sorted according to size. The largest German ￿rm in a homogeneous
industry is then matched with the largest UK ￿rm in the same industry, the second largest is
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during the same years. This matching process leads to a sample of 528 ￿rm-year observations
for both Germany and the UK and gives the closest matched sample that is possible while
still maintaining a su¢ ciently large dataset to make inferences, given the speci￿c de￿nition
of an industry that we employ.7.
Table 3 shows the results for the matched German and UK samples. The results indicate
that there are no di⁄erences in the response of investment to cash ￿ ow in the matched
samples. This is a striking result because it reverses the result reported in the previous
section for the full sample and suggests that there are not statistically signi￿cant di⁄erences
in the response to cash ￿ ow once we have controlled for size and industrial activity. In
all other respects the matched sample results appear stronger than the full sample results
because the estimated coe¢ cients on sales growth and the error correction term are larger
in absolute value and have a higher level of statistical signi￿cance, cash ￿ ow excepted. The
equations also seem well speci￿ed, since the error correction term is negative and signi￿cant
for both samples, suggesting stabilizing feedback in investment dynamics for both countries.
The most notable changes are to be found in the UK equation since far more UK ￿rms
were discarded on the grounds that they did not have a matching German company in the
sample8.
The main result from these equations is that the coe¢ cient on the cash ￿ ow variable in
the merged sample is now insigni￿cant in both cases whereas previously it was a signi￿cant
determinant of corporate investment for the UK. This ￿nding is important because it suggests
that the source of the di⁄erence between the German and British ￿rms does not lie in
the orientation of the ￿nancial systems because we do not ￿nd evidence for di⁄erences in
sensitivity once we control for size and industrial structure.
Having found that we can eliminate the distinction between UK and German ￿rms by
controlling for ￿rm-size and industry by matching, this suggests that di⁄erences between the
two countries in one or both of these factors is potentially the source of the signi￿cance of
cash ￿ ow for investment in the full samples of randomly-selected data from each country.
The change in the signi￿cance of the cash ￿ ow coe¢ cients between the full sample and the
matched sample indicates that the full sample data set contains ￿rms that are in￿ uenced by
cash ￿ ow while the matched data set does not.
To con￿rm this fact, we can attempt to reinstate the cash ￿ ow sensitivity in the corporate
investment equation for the UK by considering the ￿rms that were unmatched9. These ￿rms
7For our purpose we match on the third digit e.g. we have a matched UK and German ￿rms in NACE 15
at the three digit level so that we pair ￿rm in industry 151 (production, processing and preserving of meat
and meat products) etc.
The summary statistics of the matched sample are in the appendix.
8The actual numbers indicate a reduction from 2103 ￿rm-observations for the UK to 528, compared with
a reduction from 804 ￿rm-observations to 528 for Germany.
9Due to the fact that the German sample is smaller there are insu¢ cient unmatched ￿rms to examine
this hypothesis in the German case, but with the larger sample of UK ￿rms we are able to examine cash
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the sample of ￿rms that could not be matched we ￿nd that the unmatched ￿rms are sensitive
to cash ￿ ow. Table 3 reports the responses to cash ￿ ow for the unmatched sample of UK
￿rms in the ￿nal column and from these results we discover that cash ￿ ow is again important.
In fact the cash ￿ ow variable is highly signi￿cant at the 1% level, and has a similar coe¢ cient
value to the full sample results for UK ￿rms. We can infer from this that characteristics in
the unmatched ￿rms are responsible for the cash ￿ ow sensitivity in the full sample.
Table 3 - Investment and cash ￿ ow sensitivity
on matched versus unmatched samples
Dep. var. It=Kt￿1 Matched Sample Unmatched Sample
It=Kt￿1 Germany U.K. U.K.
It￿1=Kt￿2 -0.72 (0.15)** -0.34 (0.15)* -0.24 (0.13)
￿yt 0.76 (0.20)** 0.63 (0.15)** 0.48 (0.18)**
￿yt￿1 0.72 (0.20)** 0.45 (0.15)** 0.11 (0.14)
(k ￿ y)t￿2 -0.73 (0.20)** -0.54 (0.17)** -0.12 (0.12)
CFt=Kt￿1 -0.22 (0.14) 0.15 (0.13) 0.08 (0.15)
CFt￿1=Kt￿2 -0.14 (0.10) 0.04 (0.15) 0.29 (0.10)**
m1 -3.30 -3.19 -5.54
m2 0.38 0.14 -0.12
Sargan p-value 0.43 0.22 0.6127
N obs 314 314 916
N ￿rms 97 97 281
Notes: Parameter estimates and robust standard errors from one-step Arrelano-Bond; year-
dummies and constant included. Signi￿cance reported at 1% (**), 5% (*) levels. Sargan test of over-









While the evidence in Table 2 might have been interpreted as an indication that certain
countries face more binding ￿nancial constraints than others, and these di⁄erences might
also be associated with the di⁄erent ￿nancial systems in those countries (the UK being
relatively market-oriented and Germany being more relationship-oriented), our results in
Table 3 rule out this interpretation. Based on a closely-matched sample of ￿rms chosen to
be directly comparable Table 3 shows that there are no di⁄erences in the response to cash
￿ ow in the investment equations across countries compared to the full sample. The reasons
why cash ￿ ow is important for the full sample but not the closely-matched sample may lie
in the composition of the samples for each country with particular reference to the size and
￿ ow sensitivity of investment for the remaining sample of unmatched ￿rms.
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oriented ￿nancial systems are not responsible for the di⁄erences in the impact of ￿nancial
constraints on investment.
In the next two sections we look at the varying responses of investment to cash ￿ ow
when splitting sample according to size and industrial characteristics. If the response to
cash ￿ ow varies with size and industry-speci￿c features then it strenghtens the argument
that it is these features rather than ￿nancial system that explain the di⁄erent sensitivities
of investment to cash ￿ ow between Germany and the UK.
4.4 Cash ￿ ow sensitivity and size
The papers by Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) illustrate
that small ￿rms are more sensitive to cash ￿ ow than larger ￿rms. The theoretical argument
to support these empirical results is that larger ￿rms have greater access to external ￿nance,
and particularly non-bank external ￿nance. In this section we split the sample of ￿rms in the
full sample on the basis of absolute and relative size to determine whether the responsiveness
of corporate investment varies with that characteristic.
If there are di⁄erences in the sensitivity between the small and large ￿rms within the
UK or in Germany then it is most unlikely that the common ￿nancial system is responsible
for the di⁄erent responses to cash ￿ ow. It is much more likely that absolute or relative size is
responsible for the di⁄erences in the sensitivity to cash ￿ ow. To the extent that di⁄erences
exist between countries, such that one country has greater sensitivity to cash ￿ ow than
another, this may arise from the dominance of sensitive types of ￿rms e.g. smaller ￿rms
within the population of one country relative to another.
When we examine the behavior of ￿rms that are larger or smaller than the median (on
the basis of log real sales) for the UK and for Germany we discover that our earlier results
are robust to sample splitting. In Table 4 the coe¢ cient for cash ￿ ow in regressions for small
and large ￿rms in Germany is insigni￿cant, giving a similar interpretation of no in￿ uence of
cash ￿ ow on investment that we found before we split the sample on the basis of size10. For
the UK the results indicate that cash ￿ ow has a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on investment
for large and small ￿rms, where the di⁄erence is not statistically signi￿cant, indicating that
cash ￿ ow a⁄ects investment for both classes of ￿rms as we found in the previous section.
This ￿nding is robust to the rede￿nition of size based on the relative scale in the industry.
Table 5 reports the results when we de￿ne size in a relative sense by the ranking of the ￿rm
within its industry. The results when we split the sample into relatively large and relatively
small ￿rms on this basis give the same qualitative results as Table 4. 11
10In principal, size is also an endogenous characteristic of a ￿rm. So strictly speaking it should be treated
as a predetermined variable rather than a strict exogenous one on which one can do sample splits. However
in most ￿rm panels (as in ours) size of ￿rms changes only little from year to year and is a semi-permanent
feature of most ￿rms.
11We do not report the results for the unmatched ￿rms because we do not have a su¢ ciently large sample
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Dep. var. It=Kt￿1 Germany U.K.
Large Firms Small Firms Large Firms Small Firms
It￿1=Kt￿2 -0.64 (0.17)** -0.24(0.10)* -0.37 (0.13)** -0.18 (0.15)
￿yt 0.49 (0.16)** 0.47 (0.15)** 0.67 (0.14)** 0.21 (0.13)
￿yt￿1 0.79 (0.18)** 0.28 (0.09)** 0.27 (0.14) 0.12 (0.16)
(k ￿ y)t￿2 -0.64 (0.19)** -0.37 (0.10)** -0.32 (0.14)** -0.14 (0.17)
CFt=Kt￿1 -0.21 (0.21) -0.03 (0.18) 0.21 (0.18) 0.12 (0.12)
CFt￿1=Kt￿2 -0.02 (0.16) -0.19 (0.10) 0.31 (0.13)* 0.21 (0.09)*
m1 -3.08 -3.12 -3.95 -4.16
m2 -0.60 -1.68 0.34 0.52
Sargan 0.45 0.39 0.37 0.68
N obs 249 241 617 613
N ￿rms 73 72 188 190
Notes: Parameter estimates and robust standard errors from one-step Arrelano-Bond; year-
dummies and constant included. Signi￿cance reported at 1% (**), 5% (*) levels. Sargan test of over-









Table 5 - Cash ￿ ow sensitivity and relative size (full sample)
Dep. var. Germany U.K.
It/Kt￿1 Large Firms Small Firms Large Firms Small Firms
It￿1/Kt￿2 -0.51 (0.22)* -0.53(0.15)** -0.30 (0.15)* -0.28 (0.13)*
￿yt 0.69 (0.20)** 0.70 (0.12)** 0.45 (0.16)** 0.53 (0.15)**
￿yt￿1 0.51 (0.23)* 0.69 (0.16)** 0.27 (0.15) 0.24 (0.15)
(k-y)t￿2 -0.56 (0.22)** -0.58 (0.19)** -0.26 (0.15)** -0.27 (0.15)
CFt/Kt￿1 -0.14 (0.20) -0.23 (0.16) 0.01 (0.16) 0.10 (0.16)
CFt￿1/Kt￿2 -0.20 (0.17) -0.10 (0.11) 0.19 (0.09)* 0.28 (0.12)*
m1 -3.33 -2.78 -3.88 -3.98
m2 -1.21 1.37 -0.17 -0.49
Sargan 0.50 0.75 0.61 0.55
N obs 295 195 675 555
N ￿rms 89 56 203 175
Notes: Parameter estimates and robust standard errors from one-step Arrelano-Bond; year-
dummies and constant included. Signi￿cance reported at 1% (**), 5% (*) levels. Sargan test of over-







of German ￿rms to give meaningful results, but the results for the UK unmatched ￿rms have a similar
response to Tables 4 and 5 i.e. both small and large ￿rms are cash ￿ ow sensitive.
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May 2005￿yt￿2;￿yt￿3;￿yt￿4;(k￿y)t￿2;(k￿y)t￿3;(k￿y)t￿4;CFt￿2=Kt￿3;CFt￿3=Kt￿4;CFt￿4=Kt￿5;time
dummiesg:
A known feature of our two country samples is that German ￿rms are typically larger
than their UK counterparts. It is possible therefore that size could be the characteristic that
accounts for the di⁄erence in the sensitivity to cash ￿ ow reported in the previous section
between the full sample and the matched sample. However, the fact that even large ￿rms
in the UK are sensitive to cash ￿ ow indicates that size is not likely important. The results
in this section are in line with the results in Chatelain et al (2003), von Kalckreuth (2003)
and Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990). In comparing results from Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy and Luxembourg Chatelain et al. (2003) state that size in itself does not seem
to be su¢ cient to capture the presence of di⁄erences in external ￿nance premia. Similarly
von Kalckreuth (2003) ￿nds no di⁄erences in cash ￿ ow e⁄ects when comparing large and
small German ￿rms and argues that "being small is something essentially di⁄erent from
being badly rated and credit constrained in Germany ". Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990)
using a UK sample and splitting the sample also according to absolute and relative size ￿nd
no statistical di⁄erence in cash ￿ ow sensitivity between large and small ￿rms (although they
argue that based on the point estimates cash ￿ ow "appears " to play a more important
role for larger ￿rms). Size is likely to be correlated with industrial structure (Gertler and
Gilchrist, 1994). In the next section we look at industrial structure.
4.5 Cash ￿ ow sensitivity and industrial structure
There is a growing body of evidence that shows monetary policy has di⁄erent e⁄ects on
separate industries (c.f. Ganley and Salmon (1997) for the UK and Hayo and Uhlenbrock
(1999) for Germany) and on regions within countries (see Carlino and DeFina (1998) and
Peersman and Smets, (2004)). Since industries may be concentrated within particular regions
or countries, the literature that documents industry and regional e⁄ects may have discovered
a potential cause of country di⁄erences. Country e⁄ects may be one re￿ ection of industrial
composition. However, Dedola and Lippi (2004) have shown that when examining di⁄ering
elasticities of output in response to monetary policy by group e⁄ects for industries and
countries, industry e⁄ects dominate the country e⁄ects. If the explanation for the di⁄erences
between countries was due to industrial compositions, then industry-e⁄ects should not be
more important than country-e⁄ects, but this does not rule out that some of the di⁄erences
between countries may re￿ ect composition e⁄ects due to industrial structure. Some industries
may face di⁄erent ￿nancing constraints than others due to the scale of their investment
projects, the competition within their industry or usefulness (resale value) of their collateral,
but this is could be an important part of the puzzle over the role of cash ￿ ow on investment
across countries. In what follows we investigate these lines of inquiry.
As before we rely on sample-splitting strategy to determine whether industrial structure
is the factor that determines cash ￿ ow sensitivity. We identify several respects in which the
industrial classi￿cations of our samples di⁄er and evaluate in this section whether sample-
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expect on the basis of the papers discussed above that ￿rms that are ￿nal goods producers
or in more open export-oriented or import-competing industries should not maintain the
original ￿ndings (i.e. they should have less cash ￿ ow sensitivity even though we draw the ￿rms
from the full and the unmatched samples that previously demonstrated cash ￿ow sensitivity).
First we split the full UK and German samples into intermediate goods producers and
￿nal goods producers. We then compare the response of the cash ￿ ow sensitivity in the
investment equations for each sample. The calculation of the extent to which ￿rms are pro-
ducers of intermediate or ￿nal goods is based on the share of total industry output that is
an intermediate input by industry using the input-output tables for each country. We are
able to do this at the NACE 3 level for the UK, and at the NACE 2 level for Germany.
After ranking the industries by the proportion of the output that is an intermediate input to
another industry we can identify the industries where ￿nal goods production exceeds inter-
mediate goods production by separating the industries at the 50% mark.12 The investment
equations for ￿nal goods producers and intermediate goods producers are reported in Table
6.
For UK industries, there is no di⁄erence between intermediate and ￿nal goods producers￿
sensitivity to cash ￿ ow in investment equations - both are sensitive to cash ￿ ow - while for
German industries, both intermediate goods and ￿nal producers are not sensitive to cash ￿ ow,
con￿rming the full sample result. While there are clear di⁄erences in the sensitivity to cash
￿ ow between countries, as before, the sensitivity does not alter according to this industrial
characteristic. This is despite the fact that many of our intermediate goods producers are
found in the durable and heavy industrial goods category that were more investment intensive
and were expected to show greater sensitivity than the lighter industries ( Ganley and Salmon
(1997), Dedola and Lippi (2004), Hayo and Uhlenbrock (2000) and Peersman and Smets
(2004)). Our cross-country evidence does not pick up a consistent pattern of sensitivities for
these types of industries
12We want to be able to make inferences on the split samples. The constraints we face is to have enough
observations in all 4 subsamples. We also want to use the sample split-o⁄ point for both the UK and
Germany. Therefore the 50% mark is chosen so that we approximately split the German and UK samples,
simultaneously, into two equally sized samples.
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Table 6 - Cash ￿ ow sensitivity for intermediate
versus ￿nal goods producers (full sample)
Germany UK
inter. goods ￿nal goods inter. goods ￿nal goods
It￿1=Kt￿2 -0.38 (0.15)* -0.25 (0.16) -0.32 (0.12)* -0.27 (0.17)
￿yt 0.41 (0.17)* 0.06 (0.18) 0.54 (0.17)** 0.28 (0.15)
￿yt￿1 0.42 (0.15)** 0.32 (0.17) 0.28 (0.13)* 0.20 (0.22)
(k ￿ y)t￿2 -0.32 (0.18) 0.35 (0.18) -0.26 (0.13)* -0.28 (0.20)
CFt=Kt￿1 -0.22 (0.13) -0.09 (0.19) 0.07 (0.15) 0.22 (0.17)
CFt￿1=Kt￿2 -0.15 (0.12) -0.04 (0.11) 0.21 (0.10)* 0.23 (0.10)*
N obs 205 285 746 484
N ￿rms 63 82 228 150
m1 -3.61 -3.07 -4.64 -4.08
m2 -0.47 -0.13 -0.8 1.01
Sargan p value 0.53 0.15 0.78 0.09
Notes: Parameter estimates and robust standard errors from one-step Arrelano-Bond; year-
dummies and constant included. Signi￿cance reported at 1% (**), 5% (*) levels. Sargan test of over-
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closed industries (full samples)
Germany UK
Imports import non import import non import
-competing -competing -competing -competing
It￿1=Kt￿2 -0.50 (0.8)** -0.38 (0.15)** -0.35 (0.11)** -0.33 (0.13) *
￿yt 0.53 (0.18)** 0.39 (0.16)* 0.63 (0.14)** 0.42 (0.12)**
￿yt￿1 0.25 (0.12)* 0.55 (0.15)** 0.37 (0.13)** 0.12 (0.16)
(k ￿ y)t￿2 0.28 (0.15) ￿ -0.34 (0.12) ** -0.24 (0.17)
CFt=Kt￿1 -0.16 (0.15) 0.15 (0.21) 0.01 (0.12) 0.20 (0.16)
CFt￿1=Kt￿2 0.05 (0.15) -0.28 (0.14)* 0.12 (0.08) 0.32 (0.12)**
m1 -3.49 -2.99 -3.97 -4.65
m2 -0.74 -0.32 0.15 -0.48
Sargan 0.79 0.54 0.47 0.15
N obs 177 313 662 568
N ￿rms 55 90 203 175
Exports export domestic export domestic
-oriented -oriented -oriented -oriented
It￿1=Kt￿2 -0.49 (0.12)** -0.35 (0.14)* -0.42 (0.12)** -0.36 (0.13)**
￿yt 0.47 (0.13)** 0.31 (0.16) 0.58 (0.15)** 0.46 (0.12) **
￿yt￿1 0.52 (0.14)** 0.40 (0.14)** 0.45 (0.14)** 0.19 (0.16)
(k ￿ y)t￿2 -0.41 (0.15)** -0.50 (0.14)** -0.47 (0.13)** -0.26 (0.15)
CFt=Kt￿1 -0.17 (0.10) -0.08 (0.25) -0.09 (0.15) 0.17 (0.12)
CFt￿1=Kt￿2 0.04 (0.12) -0.01 (0.13) 0.12 (0.08) 0.27 (0.12)*
m1 -3.70 -2.73 -3.43 -4.45
m2 -0.61 -0.37 0.24 -0.47
Sargan 0.66 0.96 0.48 0.19
N obs 319 171 578 652
N ￿rms 95 50 176 202
Notes: Parameter estimates and robust standard errors from one-step Arrelano-Bond; year-
dummies and constant included. Signi￿cance reported at 1% (**), 5% (*) levels. Sargan test of over-









Second, we compare the impact of openness using a similar sample-splitting strat-
egy, ranking industries by the share of total production derived from imports (import-
competing industries versus non-import-competing industries) and exports (export-oriented
versus domestically-oriented industries). We again use the input-output tables to calculate
these shares and take our cut-o⁄ levels at 25% to de￿ne import intensive industries and
export intensive industries. We expect that ￿rms in more closed industries that are less
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in more open industries. These industries should be more sensitive to domestic monetary
policy through the interest channel, and through the ￿nancial accelerator e⁄ect may become
more sensitive to cash ￿ ow as their eligibility for external ￿nance deteriorates.
We ￿nd support for this argument for the UK. The non-import-competing and domestically-
oriented industries are more sensitive to cash ￿ ow. However in Germany, again none of the
four subsamples shows sensitivity to cash ￿ ow (with a strange exception of a negative sen-
sitivity for the non-import-competing industry.) Thus we do ￿nd results that are consistent
with the idea that openness to imports or orientation towards exports has some importance
for the sensitivity of cash ￿ ow in investment equations at least in the UK.
Taking into account the industrial features that might predispose investment in an in-
dustry to be more responsive to cash ￿ ow does not reveal the consistent results we would
expect across countries if these characteristics were the driving process for the investment-
cash ￿ ow relationship. Instead what we ￿nd is that the intermediate-￿nal goods producer
distinction hardly matters at all, and that German industry exhibits a consistent insensi-
tivity to cash ￿ ow across any split in the sample that is undertaken on industrial grounds.
This downgrades much of the evidence that these industrial features are responsible for the
di⁄erences in the response to cash ￿ ow.
4.6 Cash ￿ ow sensitivity and creditworthiness
The sample splits according to structural features (size and industry characteristics) did no
show consistent results across Germany and the UK. This casts doubt on the thesis that
structural features are determinants of cash ￿ ow sensitivity and hence ￿nancing constraints.
In this section we check whether the previous sample splits were implicitely dividing ￿rms
along the dimension of creditworthiness. Cleary (1999) shows that on the basis of a discrim-
inant analysis two indicators of creditworthiness, namely sales growth and net pro￿t margin,
were the most signi￿cant. Following Cleary (1999), we use sales growth and operating prof-
its (as a percentage of the capital stock) as indicators of creditworthiness for sub-samples of
￿rms such as small versus large ￿rms, intermediate versus ￿nal goods producing industries
etc. Due to the endogenous nature of sales growth and net pro￿t margin we cannot use the
same sample splitting methodology to compare the responses to cash ￿ ow in sub-samples.
Instead we calculate the average performance in terms of these creditworthiness variables
for our previous sub-samples i.e. small versus large ￿rms, intermediate versus ￿nal goods
producers etc. We then perform a t-test of the signi￿cance of the di⁄erence in average sales
growth and operating pro￿ts within countries across sample splits. If creditworthiness by
industry is the key driver of the relationship between investment and ￿nancial constraints
then there will be noticeable di⁄erences in the signi￿cance of coe¢ cients across sample splits
within countries indicating that sensitivities to cash ￿ ow are the result of balance sheet
considerations. We would expect that these results would be consistent irrespective of the
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Table 8 -Tests of signi￿cant di⁄erences in creditworthiness
Germany UK
Sales growth oper. pro￿ts ^ Sales growth oper. pro￿ts ^
Large vs. small (absolute) 0.02 (0.01) -0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0 .01)
Large vs. small (relative) -0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
interm vs. ￿nal -0.01 (0.01) -0.05 (0.02)** 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
import-comp vs. non import comp 0.01 (0 .01) -0.03 (0.02) 0.01 (0 .01) 0.03 (0.01)**
export-oriented vs. dom. oriented 0.03 (0.01)** -0.07 (0.02)** 0.02 (0.01)** 0.04 (0.01)**
^Operating pro￿ts as a percentage of the capital stock.
The table reports the di⁄erence in average sales growth and operating pro￿ts with standard errors in brackets
For Germany, when splitting samples, none of the sub-samples of industries or size
classes has a better performance on both average sales growth and average pro￿ts relative
to the counterpart sub-sample. For instance, large versus small ￿rms show the same per-
formance. The export-oriented industry has a better performance on sales growth but a
worse performance on operating pro￿ts. Insigni￿cant di⁄erences and absence of cash ￿ ow
sensitivity in Germany across sample splits are consistent with the absence of signi￿cant
creditworthiness di⁄erences.
In the UK however, the ￿nding on the lower sensitivity of export oriented industries
is con￿rmed with better performance on both average sales growth and operating pro￿ts.
The ￿nding on the lower sensitivity of the import-competing industries is con￿rmed by the
better performance on the operating pro￿ts (but the average sales growth is not signi￿cantly
di⁄erent)
A consistent pattern emerges across countries and across industries that identi￿es those
industries with higher proportions of ￿rms with lower sales growth and lower levels of oper-
ating pro￿ts (i.e. worse performance on both measures of creditworthiness at the same time)
to be more sensitive to cash ￿ ow. While there is more robust evidence to support creditwor-
thiness arguments elsewhere, we demonstrate here that while the structural interpretations
of di⁄erent cash ￿ ow sensitivities can be rejected using our panels of British and German
￿rms, the creditworthiness interpretation cannot be dismissed so easily 13. We conclude from
this that the balance sheet channel proposed by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Bernanke
at al. (1996, 1999) receives some support, since ultimately indicators of creditworthiness at
the industry level is associated with the extent to which a ￿rm depends on internal ￿nance
to fund investment.
13Our results contrasts with the results of Clearly who ￿nds that ￿rms with high ￿nancial health were
more sensitive to the available funds than less creditworthy ￿rms. However, it is possible that Cleary result
can be explained by ￿rms in ￿nancial distress. These ￿rms are restricted to use cash ￿ ow for investment
purposes by debt covenant imposed by bond holders or banks, implying a lower sensitivity of investment to
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Much of the puzzle over the driving forces behind the relationship between cash ￿ ow and
investment arises from the correlation between indicators of ￿nancial structure, industrial
structure, size and creditworthiness. Many of these indicators are good proxies for the
others and therefore can easily be confused empirically as drivers of the investment-cash
￿ ow relationship. The purpose of this paper is to suggest one means of discriminating
between them by underscoring the importance of appropriate sample selection when doing
comparative studies of corporate investment and ￿nancial constraints across countries. We
take pains to ensure we make fair comparisons across countries by controlling for di⁄erences
between countries and within samples.
Some samples of our data can provide evidence that is consistent with the idea that ￿rms
in more market-oriented ￿nancial systems such as the UK have greater cash ￿ ow sensitivity
than ￿rms in more relationship-oriented systems such as Germany. But this evidence is
drawn from samples where no particular attention is given to selecting ￿rms on the basis
that they are comparable in terms of size and industrial activity. When we select our sample
to ensure comparability we can show that this is a sample-speci￿c result; and one that can
be overturned by taking samples that control for industry and size to ensure that the ￿rms
drawn from each country are as similar as possible. In this case we ￿nd there is no di⁄erence
in sensitivity to cash ￿ ow in each country, so that once comparability is made the basis for
selection there is no di⁄erence in the sensitivity of German or British ￿rms to cash ￿ ow and
therefore no reason to suppose that the ￿nancial systems of each country are responsible for
the di⁄erences in cash ￿ ow sensitivity of investment.
The same argument is taken further to explore other potential drivers such as ￿rm
size or industrial structure. We ￿nd, after controlling for other determinants of cash ￿ ow
sensitivity, that neither absolute or relative size, nor the type of industrial structure under
which the ￿rms operate, such as openness to import competition or orientation to export
markets, or production of ￿nal versus intermediary goods drives the investment-cash ￿ ow
relationship. Instead we present new results to demonstrate that industries in which a
higher proportion of ￿rms with high sales growth and operating pro￿ts (i.e. those with
observable high performance) are insensitive to cash ￿ ow, while industries where a higher
proportion of ￿rms are observably performing less well are more sensitive to cash ￿ ow. It is
reasonable to suppose that ￿rms in industries with healthy ￿nancial performance have less
di¢ culty obtaining external funds and therefore are relatively less sensitive to the availability
of internal ￿nance when undertaking investment. We conclude that it is the performance of
certain types of industries, in terms of sales and pro￿ts, that opens up access for ￿rms in
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6.1 Data Sources
The primary source of the data is the AMADEUS database from Bureau Van Dijk. We use the
following two releases: the CD-rom June 2001 and the CD-rom September 1997. The database
includes ￿rm balance sheet and pro￿t and loss information. We only select ￿rms that have consol-
idated data; this means that data are all on the group level ( capital stock, assets, turnover, etc.)
This makes our study more comparable with US studies based on Compustat, which also reports
consolidated data. In addition unconsolidated accounts can give a very misleading picture of the
true nature of the ￿rm. It is customary that the output of a large ￿rm is usually produced over
multiple plants, each (or a few taken together) with own legal identity and own unconsolidated
account. For instance, BASF AG, has a consolidated turnover of around 30 billion euro, where
it has an unconsolidated one of around 11 billion euro. Second, the true ￿nancial boundaries of
the ￿rms are the group not the individual plants. For instance for investment purposes, cash ￿ ow
generated by one plant can easily be transferred to other plants. For each ￿rm and each year,
we extract from the database turnover, pro￿t/loss, operating results, deprecation and book value
of ￿xed capital and nace-2 and 3 digit code. We de￿ne nominal cash ￿ ow as pro￿t/loss plus
depreciation.
6.2 Variable Construction
We de￿ne nominal operating pro￿ts as operating results + depreciation. We de￿ ate turnover,
nominal cash ￿ ow and nominal operating pro￿ts by the industry output de￿ ator. The industry
output de￿ ators at the 2 digit NACE level are obtained from the UK O¢ ce for National Statistics
and Statistisch Bundesambt Deutschland. ( The UK series are: PP Indices MM22, Table 2: Price
indices of UK output all manufacturing and selected industries- SIC (92). The German series
are Segment 3783 Index der Erzeugerpreise gewerblicher Produkte(1995=100) : insgesamt, nach
G￿tergruppen, -Zweigen, -Klassen und-Arten des GP, Ausgabe 1995(Deutschland) (1994 bis 2002).
Nominal investment NIt+1of year t+1 is constructed as the di⁄erence between book value of
￿xed capital of (end of) year t+1 and end of year t adding depreciation of year t+1. De￿ ators
of nominal investment are constructed from current and constant prices investment series at the
industry level (for the UK: Business investment (release of the UK statistical o¢ ce), revised results-
2nd quarter 2002) (For Germany: Segment 7721 Bruttoanlageinvestitionen(in jeweiligen Preisen),
Segment 7724 Bruttoanlageinvestitionen(in Preisen von 1995).
The real capital stock Kt is constructed using the traditional perpetual inventory method.
Since the book values of ￿xed capital for the ￿rst year of observation for each ￿rm are at historical
prices we multiply the initial book value of ￿xed capital by a factor to account for historical in￿ ation
to get replacement values (i.e. price at time t) for the initial value of the capital stock. The capital
(end of period) of future years is then obtained by the perpetual inventory formula
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NIt+1
Pit+1
Intermediate goods versus ￿nal goods industries. For the UK industries we refer to the NACE
3 level of industrial classi￿cation. The demand for industry output by other industries (ID) is
calculated less the demand from the same industry (OD), hence total demand for the output by
other industries is calculated by subtracting own demand on the diagnonal of the input-output
table (ID-OD). This intermediate demand is divided by total domestic output (DY) taken from the
UK 1995 input-output table. All ￿gures are in 1995 basic prices in sterling millions. The ￿gures
are converted to a percentage and are ranked. The industries with the largest share of intermediate
demand to total output are regarded as intermediate good producing industries, and those with
the smallest share are the ￿nal good producing industries. The cut o⁄ value is 50% to re￿ ect the
fact that for ￿rms below the cut o⁄ the majority of the ￿rms￿output is destined for intermediate
consumption, and for those above the majority is destined for ￿nal consumption. Hence
100*(M/Y)> 50% ￿nal good producing industries
100*(M/Y)<= 50% intermediate good producing industries
For the German industries the same procedure is followed at the NACE 2 level of industrial
classi￿cation (NACE 3 being unavailable). The data for intermediate demand is taken from the use
1995 table and domestic output is taken from the domestic 1995 table of the input-output table
for 1995. Figures are in 1995 basic prices in euro millions.
Recalculations using total output (Y), which is the sum of domestic output (DY) plus im-
ports (M = MEU+MNEU) did not signi￿cantly alter the rank orderings and the divide between
intermediate and ￿nal goods producing industries was unchanged for both countries.
Import-intensive versus non-import intensive industries. For the UK industries we refer to the
NACE 3 level of industrial classi￿cation. The data on import-intensity are derived by summing
the imports (M) from the EU (MEU) and non-EU (MNUE) countries. Imports are divided by the
total output of the industry (Y) which is the sum of total domestic output (DY) plus imports (M
= MEU+MNEU) taken from the UK 1995 input-output table. All ￿gures are in 1995 basic prices
in sterling millions. The ￿gures are converted to a percentage and are ranked. The industries with
the largest share of imports to total output are regarded as import-intensive industries, and those
with the smallest share are the non-import intensive industries. The measure of import-intensive
and non-import-intensive industries is a relative measure, and to capture this fact we set the cut
o⁄ value at 25% to split the sample with an indication of relative exposure to imports. Hence
100*(M/Y)> 25% import intensive
100*(M/Y)<= 25% non import intensive
For the German industries the same procedure is followed at the NACE 2 level of industrial
classi￿cation (NACE 3 being unavailable). The data for imports and output are taken from the
supply95 table of the input-output table for 1995. Figures are in 1995 basic prices in euro millions.
Imports are calculated on a carriage, insurance and freight (c.i.f.) basis.
Export-oriented versus domestically-oriented industries.For UK industries we refer to the
NACE 3 level of industrial classi￿cation. The data on orientation of sales are derived by cal-
culating the exports (X) as the sum of the EU (XEU) and non-EU (XNUE) exports taken from
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industry (Y), which is the sum of domestic output (DY) plus imports (M = MEU+MNEU). All
￿gures are in 1995 basic prices in sterling millions. The ￿gures are converted to a percentage and
are ranked. The industries with the largest share of exports to total output are regarded as export-
oriented industries, and those with the smallest share are the domestic-oriented industries. As
above, the measure of export-oriented and domestic-oriented is a relative measure, and to capture




For the German industries the same procedure is followed at the NACE 2 level of industrial
classi￿cation(NACE 3 being unavailable). The data for output is taken from the supply95 table
and data for exports is taken from the use1995 table of the input-output table for 1995. Figures
are in 1995 basic prices in euro millions. Exports are calcualted on a free on board (f.o.b.) basis
6.3 Summary Statistics of Matched and Unmatched Samples
The summary statistics of the matched samples are given in Table A.1. Again the matched German
and the matched UK sample are very much alike, and the matched sample statistics do not seem
to be particularly di⁄erent from the full sample statistics. A potential problem of matching
could be that one incurs a big loss in terms of the numbers of sub-industries in manufacturing.
This does not happen in our sample because Germany and the UK both have a broad base of
manufacturing. The matched sample is diverse in terms of number of di⁄erent 3-digit NACE
industries since the matched sample contains ￿rms from 41 di⁄erent NACE three digit industries,
where no single industry dominates the sample14. Table A.1 also provides the summary statistics of
the ￿rms without a match. Again the summary statistics of the unmatched samples are relatively
similar across countries and relatively similar to the full sample statistics.We conclude that, the
full, matched and unmatched samples look very much alike in terms of the levels and standard
deviations of the variables. If we ￿nd di⁄erences accross sample in the estimation results, it has to
be due to other reasons than the level of the variables themselves.
14The largest number of ￿rm-year observations are from the manufacture of beverages industry
(NACE 159), 8.9 %, the second largest is the manufacture of other special purpose machinery
(NACE 295) 7.6%, the third largest is the manufacturing of machinery for the production and use
of mechanical power (NACE 291) 7%.
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Matched Germany UK
mean (s.d.) min max mean (s.d.) min max
It=Kt￿1 0.16 (0.15) -0.260 0.94 0.14 (.16) -0.56 0.94
￿yt 0.04 (0.10) -0.50 0.60 0.03 (.15) -0.73 0.79
CFt=Kt￿1 0.25 (0.27) -0.24 2.04 0.23 (.23) -0.39 1.82
(k ￿ y)t￿2 1.01 (0.47) -0.13 2.57 1.06 (.59) -0.68 2.81
N. Obs. 528 528
N. ￿rms 97 97
Unmatched Germany UK
mean (s.d.) min max mean (s.d.) min max
It=Kt￿1 0.15 (0.13) -0.35 0.70 0.14 (0.17) -0.83 0.99
￿yt 0.03 (0.13) -0.68 0.49 0.04 (0.16) -1.02 0.95
CFt=Kt￿1 0.20 (0.12) -0.20 0.60 0.22 (0.21) -0.50 1.76
(k ￿ y)t￿2 1.12 (0.51) -0.10 2.29 1.14 (0.65) -0.55 3.22
N. Obs. 276 1575
N. ￿rms 48 281
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